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[L. A. No. 22540.
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[42 C.2d

OsBORN

In Bank.

Ma!'. 1, 1954.]

MERINOETH R. OSBORN, Appellant, v. LOUISE L.
OSBORN, Respondent.
[1] Deeds-Delivery-Deposit for Delivery After Grantor's Death.
-Deposit of deed granting an estate in fee simple, with instructions that it be transmitted to grantee on grantor's death,
conveys a remainder interest in fee simple with life estate
reserved in grantor if grantor intended deposit to be irrevocable.
[2] Escrows-Effect of Escrow: Time When Instrument Becomes
Effective.-Where a deed is deposited in escrow pursuant to
binding contract of sale of a remainder, the grantee, at time
of execution of contract of sale, acquires an equitable title to
estate being sold, and grantor retains legal title as security
for purchase price; and the legal title passes to grantee at
time of his completion of conditions precedent, whether or not
escrow holder gives him physical possession of the deed.
[3] !d.-Delivery to Depositary.-Grantor's delivery of deed to
escrow holder is absolute and cannot be disaffirmed after
grantee's performance of escrow conditions.
[4a, 4b] Deeds-Delivery-Deposit for Delivery After Grantor's
Death.-Where deed from father to son was executed pursuant
to a binding contract supported by adequate consideration and
on its face reserved a life estate to father and granted remainder to son, and where, at time father delivered deed to
trustees, there were no conditions precedent for son to perform,
the provision that trustees should hold deed until father's death
was not a condition precedent to passage of legal title; legal
title was conveyed when deed was delivered to trustees.
[5] Id.-Delivery-Intent.-Whether a deed has been delivered is
a question of intent.
[6] Id.-Delivery-Intent.-While in some cases to ascertain
grantor's intent it is necessary to have recourse to his acts
and declarations both before and after his transmission of
deed to grantee or a third party, when grantor's only instructions are in writing, effect of trans~ction depends on true

'
[1] See Cal.Jur., Deeds, § 70; Am.Jur., Deeds, § 143 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Escrows, § 16; Am.Jur., Escrows, § 25 et seq.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Deeds, §52; Am.Jur., Deeds, § 116 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Deeds,§ 80(1); [2] Escrows,§§ 2, 22;
[3] Escrows,§ 9; [4, 7] Deeds,§ 81(1); [5, 6] Deeds,§ 66(1); [8]
Deeds, § 66(7); [9] Deeds, § 75; [10] Deeds, § 149; [11] Appeal
and Error, § 1409; [12] Appeal and Error, § 1357.
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construction of the writing, in which case it is a pure question
of law whether or not there was an absolute delivery.
[7] !d.-Delivery-Deposit for Delivery After Grantor's Death.Where deed by which father granted property to son subject
to life estate in father was delivered to trustees pursuant to
provisions of a trust agreement and nothing remained to be
done to vest legal title to remainder in son, father was bound
by terms of trust agreement, executed contemporaneously
with deed, not to attempt to recall deed from possession of
trustees.
[8] !d.-Delivery-Surrender of ControL-Grantor did not retain
control over deed after he delivered it to trustees where there
was nothing in or external to trust agreement pursuant to
which deed was executed, to indicate that he did not intend
transmission of deed to be a valid legal delivery, where whole
tenor of such agreement was that he intended to grant his
son a presently vested remainder interest, where in a prior
"stipulation" executed with his son he promised that he would
execute documents necessary to transfer a remainder interest
to son, and where trust agreement contained a number of
restrictions on grantor's right to use property during his lifetime.
[9] Id.-Delivery-Intent.-Grantor's conduct, after execution of
deed granting realty to son subject to life estate in grantor
and delivery of deed to trustees, in requesting assignee of
creditor to sell certificate from execution sale of son's interest
in property and in negotiating with son (after execution sale)
for purchase of his interest in property, is corroborative of
grantor's intent, as revealed in a "stipulation" and trust
agreement executed with son, to grant son a presently vested
remainder interest.
[10] Id.-Reservations.-Grantor's reservation of right to revoke
deed giving grantee a vested remainder interest, in event that
grantee should harm grantor or refuse to carry out terms of
trust agreement executed contemporaneously with deed, does
not make delivery to trustees conditional so that no estate
vests in grantee by virtue of deposit with trustees, but merely
limits future interest created to a vested remainder subject
to being divested on happening of a condition subsequent.
[11] Appeal-Determination-Partial ReversaL-The failure to
take an appeal demonstrates only satisfaction with judgment
as is, not as changed by a partial reversal; one may elect to
stand on a judgment which he believes does not give him all
of benefits to which he is entitled, and he may be persuaded
to permit unfavorable portions to stand in reliance on benefits
received in the other parts, in which instance, to do justice
a reversal of portion from which appeal was taken might
require a reversal of other provisions.
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[12] !d.-Determination-Scope and Extent of Relief.-Where
both parts of judgment embrace identical issue of whether
plaintiff acquired a remainder interest under deed, and where
Supreme Court's decision that remainder interest passed under
deed removes basis of trial comt's decision adverse to defendant, who did not appeal, a complete reversal of judgment
is appropriate, in order that defendant may have opportunity
to establish her claim that an execution sale of plaintiff's remainder interest was valid.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ben V. Curler, Judge.* Reversed.
Action to quiet title to real property, in which defendant
filed cross-complaint for similar relief. Judgment adverse
to plaintiff on original complaint and for plaintiff on crosscomplaint, reversed.
Guerin & Guerin and John J. Guerin for Appellant.
Louis Warren for Respondent.
TR.A YNOR, J.-Plaintiff lVIerinoeth Osborn appeals from
an adverse judgment on his complaint to quiet title to certain real property in Los Angeles County, known as Lot 97
of the Casa Verduga Villa Tract. Defendant Louise Osborn,
plaintiff's stepmother, answered and cross-complained to have
title to Lot 97 quieted in her. Judgment was entered for
plaintiff on the cross-complaint, and defendant Louise Osborn
has not appealed therefrom. The other defendants named in
the complaint disclaim any interest in the property.
Lot 97 was originally acquired by lVIerinoeth 's mother,
Chloie Osborn, in 1922. Chloie died intestate leaving her
husband, Thomas D. Osborn, and their son, lVIerinoeth, snrvlvmg. On June 27, 1939, during the administration of
Chloie 's estate, Merinoeth and Thomas executed a "Stipulation,'' subsequently approved by the court, to resolve their
conflicting claims to Chloie 's estate. The material part of
this stipulation follows : "It is furtHer stipulated and agreed
by and between the parties hereto that upon execution of the
within Stipulation that 'l'homas D. Osborn will exeeute either
by deed contraet or declaration of trust sufficient documents,
conveyances or declarations so that the property known as
[;ot 97, Casa Verduga Villa Tract,
will be retained m
* A~signed by Chairman of Judicial Couneil.
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the name of Thomas D. Osborn, during his lifetime and that
the same should vest in his son Merinoeth R Osborn at the
time of the demise of the said 'l'homas D. Osborn." After the
execution of the stipulation, the probate conrt diRtributed
Lot 97 to Thomas.
On July 7, 1939, pursuant to the stipulation, Thomas and
lVIerinoeth executed a trust agreement, and Thomas executed
a deed ''in accordance with the terms and conditions of that
certain trust agreement of July 7th, 1939, . . . and . . . subJect to all conditions, exceptions and reservations as in said
trust agreement provided." (Italics added.)
The deed
granted Lot 97 to Merinoeth subject to a life estate in
'rhomas. The trust agreement provided that the deed to Lot
97 ''shall be turned over and delivered to the Trustees to hold
and keep possession of said deed, not to record the same during the lifetime of'' Thomas. The trustees were instructed
to "turn over and deliver" the deed to Merinoeth on the
death of Thomas. It was recited in the trust agreement
that Thomas reserved a life estate in the property, and that
he also reserved "the right to revoke the deed in the event
[Merinoeth] wilfully harms [Thomas], and [Merinoeth] reserves the right to cancel this agreement if [Thomas] wilfully harms" him. (Italics added.) Other material parts
of the trust agreement are: "The parties hereto further
agree that in the event any attempt is made by either party
hereto to break the terms of the within trust agreement, or
to force the trustees to surrender the within described deed
prior to the demise of [Thomas] by court action, or other
proceedings, then, in that event, the party attempting to break
the terms of the within trust agreement, shall pay in addition
to expenses and court costs, a reasonable attorney's fee to
the said trustees. The parties hereto further anthorize and
instruct the t1·ustees herein mentioned to defend any attempts
made by either parties hereto to break the terms of the within
trust agreement, or to force the trustees to surrender the
within described deed . . . . The wilfull failure or refusal on
the party [sic] of either party hereto to carry ont the terms
and conditions of the within trust agreement, or the wilful!
refusal or failure of either party to comply with the obligations herein provided, on his part to be performed, shall permit either party to rescind this agreement and shall confer
upon the grantor the right to cancel the within mentioned
deed and this agreement by a declaration duly executed and
recorded with the formality of a deed and a thirty day writ-
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ten notice thereof served· on the grantee, or his attorney.''
(Italics added.) The deed was deposited with defendants
Franklin and Warner, who were named as trustees in the
trust agreement.
Merinoeth had become indebted to \¥ arner for legal services
in the probate of Chloie 's estate and the preparation of the
trust agreement. In 1941, Warner resigned as trustee and
assigned his claim against Merinoeth to his secretary, Champion, who recovered judgment thereon. Execution was levied
on Merinoeth 's interest in Lot 97, and the property was sold
in 1942 to Champion for $336.37. Thereafter, at the request
of Thomas, Champion transferred the certificate of sale to
Louise Osborn for $415. Although Louise contends that Merinoeth had notice of these proceedings, he made no appearance and disclaims any knowledge of them.
In anticipation of a sale of Merinoeth's interest in Lot 97
to Thomas, an agreement purporting to cancel the trust agreement was executed on January 14, 1946 and then cancelled
in March 1946. Thomas died intestate on December 31, 1946,
leaving his second wife, Louise, and Merinoeth surviving.
Merinoeth 's subsequent demand upon the trustees for the
deed executed by Thomas was refused.
In refusing to quiet title in either Merinoeth or Louise, the
trial court concluded that Merinoeth had not acquired any
interest in Lot 97 under the deed executed by Thomas and
deposited with Warner and Franklin. Since Merinoeth had
acquired no interest, the court concluded that Louise acquired
none by reason of the execution sale.
Plaintiff's basic contention on this appeal is that the trial
court erred in holding that he acquired no interest in Lot 97
under the deed executed by Thomas and deposited with Warner and Franklin to be transmitted to him on the death of
Thomas. Plaintiff contends that the deposit with Warner
and Franklin constituted a valid delivery immediately vesting in him a remainder interest in the property. The first
issue to be resolved, therefore, is the validity and effect of thP
deed executed by Thomas.
[1] It has long been established in this state that the de·
posit of a deed granting an estate in fee simple, with instructions that it be transmitted to the grantee upon the death
of the grantor, conveys a remainder interest in fee simple
with a life estate reserved in the grantor, if the grantor intended the deposit to be irrevocable. (Bury v. Young, 98 Cal.
446, 451-452 [33 P. 338, 35 Am.St.Rep. 186] ; H1tnt v. Wicht,
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174 Cal. 205, 206-208 [162 P. 639, L.R.A. 1917C 961]; Wilkerson v Seib, 20 Cal.2d 556, 560 [127 P.2d 904].) Theresult is the same as if the grantor delivered to the grantee a
deed reserving a life estate and granting a remainder in fee.
[2] The same result is also accomplished by the deposit of
a deed in escrow pursuant to a binding contract of sale of
a remainder and the grantee's performance of the conditions of the escrow. At the time of the execution of the contract
of sale, the grantee acquires an equitable title to the estate
being sold; the grantor retains the legal title as security
for the purchase price. The legal title passes to the grantee
at the time of his completion of the conditions precedent,
whether or not the escrow holder gives him physical possession of the deed; [3] the grantor's delivery to the escrow holder
is absolute and cannot thereafter be disaffirmed. (Cannon
v. Handley, 72 Cal. 133, 140 [13 P. 315] ; McDonald v. Huff,
77 Cal. 279, 282 [19 P. 499]; Bradbury v. Davenport, 120 Cal.
152, 154 [52 P. 301]; see, also, Hagge v. Drew, 27 Cal.2d
368, 375 [165 P.2d 461] .)
[4a] In the present case, the deed from Thomas to Merinoeth was executed pursuant to a binding contract supported
by adequate consideration. On the face of the deed, Thomas
reserved a life estate and granted a remainder to Merinoeth.
When Thomas delivered the deed to the trustees, there were
no conditions precedent for Merinoeth to perform. Thomas
had. received the consideration for the grant, when the compromise settlement of Chloie's estate was executed. The provision that the trustees should hold the deed until Thomas'
death was not a condition precedent to the passage of legal
title, for even in cases of gift, e.g., Bury v. Yottng, supra, an
instruction that the depositary is to retain possession of the
deed until the death of the grantor does not prevent the deed
from being operative as a present conveyance. In this case,
Merinoeth was not a donee; he was a purchaser for value, already vested with an equitable title to the remainder. The
situation is thus analogous to that of a true escrow after the
purchaser has performed all of the conditions precedent. Performance of those conditions automatically vests the legal
title in him, even though the escrow holder retains possession
of the deed.
Defendant contends, however, that Thomas did not make
a legal delivery of the deed. [5] Delivery is a question of
intent. [6] In some cases to ascertain the grantor's intent
it is necessary to have recourse to his acts and declarations
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both before and after his transmission of the deed to the
grantee or a third party (Will1:arns v. Kicld, 170 Cal. 631, 649652 [151 P. 1, Ann.Cas. 1916E 703] ; Rice v. Carey, 170 Cal.
748, 753-754 [151 P. 135]; Donahue v. Sweeney, 171 Cal. 3~8,
391-392 [153 P. 708]; Northern Calif. Conference Assn. v.
Srnith, 209 Cal. 26, 33 [285 P. 314]). When, as here, however, the grantor's "only instructions are in writing, the
effect of the transaction depends upon the true construction
of the writing. It is in other words a pure question of law
whether there was an absolute delivery or not." (Moore v.
Trott, 156 Cal. 353, 357 [104 P. 578, 134 Am.St.Rep. 131].)
[7] Thomas executed the deed and delivered it to the trustees
pursuant to the provisions of the trust agreement. It was a
completed act and nothing remained to be done to vest the
legal title to the remainder in Merinoeth. Thomas was bound
by the terms of the trust agreement, executed contemporaneously with the deed, not to attempt to recall the deed from
the possession of the trustees. The trustees were specifically
instructed to resist any attempt by either Thomas or Merinoeth to obtain possession of the deed prior to the demise of
Thomas, and were further instructed to hold the deed for the
benefit of Merinoeth. Even if it had been contended that
Merinoeth had harmed Thomas or failed to carry out the
terms of the trust agreement and Thomas had wished to assert
his right to revoke, he could not recall the deed; he had to
execute and record a declaration of revocation with the formality of a deed, after giving 30 days' notice thereof to
Merinoeth, who might then defeat the proposed revocation by
showing that there was no violation of the trust agreement.
[8] It is clear, therefore, that Thomas. did not retain control over the deed after he delivered it to the trustees.· There
is nothing in the trust agreement, or external to it, to indicate
that Thomas did not intend the transmission of the deed to
the trustees to be a valid legal delivery. Indeed, the whole
tenor of the stipulation and the trust agreement is that Thomas
intended to grant Merinoeth a presently vested remainder
interest. In the stipulation of June 27th, Thomas promised
that "upon execution of the within Stipulation" he would
execute the documents necessary to transfer a remainder interest to Merinoeth. The trust agreement contained a number
of restrictions on Thomas' right to use the property during
his lifetime. If Merinoeth was not to have a presently vested
remainder interest, these provisions were superfluous. [9] Furthermore, Thomas' conduct after the execution and delivery
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of the deed, in requesting Champion to sell the certificate
from the execution sale and in negotiating with Merinoeth
in 1946 (after the execution sale) for the purchase of his interest in the property for $3,500, is corroborative of 'l'homas'
intent as revealed in the documents.
Defendant contends, however, that Thomas' reservation of
the right to' revoke the deed, in the event that Merinoeth
harmed him or refused to carry out the terms of the trust
agreement, made the delivery to the trustees conditional so
that no estate vested in Merinoeth by virtue of the deposit of
the deed with the trustees. This contention cannot be sustained. [10] Thomas' right to revoke did not affect the
delivery to the trustees, but merely limited the future interest created to a vested remainder subject to being divested
upon the happening of a condition subsequent. The situation
is similar to that in Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home,
167 Cal. 570 [140 P. 242], where the grantor reserved an unqualified right to revoke on the face of the deed, which granted
a remainder in fee to vest in possessioii at the termination of
the grantor's life estate. It was there held that the grantee
acquired a remainder subject to a condition subsequent, and
that "The power to revoke did not operate to destroy, or in
anywise to restrict the effect of the deed as a present conveyance of a future vested interest.'' ( 167 Cal. 570, 578 ; see, also,
Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 642-643 [154 P. 306];
Scott, The Law of Trusts, 1939, vol. 1, § 57.1.) These cases
are distinguishable from those on which defendant relies to
sustain her contention that the grantor's reservation of a
right to revoke renders the delivery conditional. (See Kenney
v. Parks, 125 Cal. 146, 150-151 [57 P. 772]; Moore v. Trott,
156 Cil. 353, 357 [104 P. 578, 134 Am.St.Rep. 131] ; Long v.
Ryan, 166 Cal. 442, 445 [137 P. 29] .) The latter cases were
eases of gift, and the court was concerned with the problem
of attempted testamentary disposition without compliance
with the statute of wills. In those cases, the grantors reserved
the right to recall their deeds from the depositary. It was
found that the respective grantors did not intend any interest
to pass to the grantees when the deeds were given to the
depositary, but only intended an interest to pass at the time
of their death. The right to revoke was, therefore, a right to
recall the deed, and attached to the delivery and not to the
interest granted. [4b] In the present case, the deed was
executed and delivered to the trustees, not to accomplish any
testamentary purpose, but to discharge Thomas' obligations
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under the contraet he entered into with Merinoeth to compromise their conflicting claims to Chloie 's estate. 'l'his contract
vested Merinoeth with an equitable title to the remainder, since
he had a specifically enforceable right to have 'rlwmas convey
the legal title. The legal title was conveyed when the deed
was delivered to the trustees under a binding contract that
made the delivery irrevocable. (Cannon v. Handley, supra;
McDonald v. Huff, supra; Pot hast v. Kind, 218 Cal. 192, 195
[24 P.2d 771] ; see, also, Brunoni v. Brunoni, 93 Cal.App.2d
215, 219 [208 P.2d 1028] .) Although Thomas could have
accomplished the same result by delivering a deed to Merinoeth
with the same reservations as those set forth in the trust agreement (see Tennant v. John Tennant Memon'al Home, supra)
-just as in the cases like Bury v. Young, supra, the same
result could be accomplished by delivery to the grantee of a
deed granting a remainder interest-the effect of the transaction is the same : Merinoeth acquired a vested remainder
subject to divestment should he breach the terms of the trust
agreement.
The only question remaining is the order that should now
be made by this court. Merinoeth contends that the part of
the judgment refusing to quiet title in him should be reversed
with directions to enter a judgment quieting his title to the
property and that the part of the judgment refusing to quiet
title in Louise should be affirmed because she did not appeal.
This contention cannot be sustained.
The trial court determined that Merinoeth did not obtain
an interest under the deed and therefore refused to quiet title
either in him or in Louise. If Merinoeth did not acquire a
remainder interest, Louise could acquire nothing by the execution sale. Apparently in the belief that as a result of the
judgment each party would get half the property as a! heir
of Thomas, Louise did not appeal. Merinoeth appealed, contending that he acquired a remainder interest under the deed,
that the execution sale did not pass any interest to Louise, and
that he was therefore entitled to the property. Had Louise
appealed, her position could only be that Merinoeth acquired
a remainder interest and that the execution sale was effective.
That contention, however, would concede the first half of
Merinoeth 's proof-that he acquired a remainder interesta concession fatal to a claim that she was entitled to half the
property as an heir of Thomas. She was apparently willing
to let the judgment stand and take half an interest as heir
rather than risk an adverse ruling with respect to the execu-
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tion sale, which would leave her with nothing. [11] "[T]he
failure to take an appeal demonstrates only satisfaction with
the judgment as is, not as changed by a partial reversal. One
may elect to stand upon a judgment which, he believes, although largely in his favor, does not give him all of the benefits
to which he is entitled. To avoid the time and expense of
further litigation, he may be persuaded to permit the unfavorable portions to stand in reliance upon the benefits received
in the other parts." (Ameriwn Enterprise~ Inc. v. Van
Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 210,221 [246 P.2d 935].)
[12] Both parts of the judgment turned on the trial
court's construction of the deed and agreement. It refused
to quiet title in Merinoeth on the ground that he did not
acquire an interest by the deed and agreement; it refused to
quiet title in Louise for the same reason. Since both parts of
the judgment embrace the identical issue-did Merinoeth
acquire a remainder interest under the deed-we have jurisdiction to review the entire judgment. (American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, supra, 39 Cal.2d 210, 217; Blacke
v. Blache, 37 Cal.2d 531, 538 [233 P.2d 547] ; Milo v. Prior,
210 Cal. 569, 571 [292 P. 647] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 CaL
360, 362 [125 P. 904, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1319) .) Our decision
that a remainder interest passed under the deed removes the
basis of the trial court's decision adverse to Louise and unless the entire judgment is reversed she will be denied an
opportunity to establish her claim that the execution sale was
valid. A complete reversal is therefore appropriate. (Blache
v. Blache, supra; Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 798 [221
P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152]; Estate of Murphey, 7 Cal.2d 712,
717 [62 P.2d 374]; cf. Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602,
609 [248 P.2d 910].)
The judgment is reversed. The parties are to bear their
own costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
reversal of that portion of the judgment from which plaintiff
appealed, which reads as follows: ''That plaintiff take nothing by reason of his amended complaint herein and that defendant Louise L. Osborn have judgment for costs of court
expended in the sum of $____, '' but I dissent from the
holding of the majority that the judgment against defendant
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and cross-complainant from which no appeal was taken must
also be reversed. That portion of the judgment reads as
follows : ''That cross-complainant take nothing by reason of
her cross-complaint herein, and that cross-defendant Merinoeth
R. Osborn have judgment for costs of court expended in the
sum of$
''
It is obvious from a reading of the majority opinion that
the two portions of the judgment above quoted are separate
and distinct and that they are in nowise interdependent, or
that the portion from which plaintiff and cross-defendant has
appealed is so connected with the remainder, from which
no appeal was taken, that the appeal from the first part affects the second part and involves a consideration of the
whole judgment. This conclusion is manifest from the face
of the majority opinion itself where it discusses in detail both
the facts and the law relating to plaintiff's side of the case
but only gives a passing reference to the basis upon which
defendant and cross-complainant claims title to the property.
The majority opinion does not purport to hold that there
would have been merit in an appeal prosecuted by defendant
and cross-complainant if such an appeal had been taken.
Notwithstanding this situation, the majority directs the reversal of the entire judgment so that the claims of the defendant and cross-complainant set up in her cross-complaint
may again be litigated in the trial court.
In so holding the majority goes outside of the record in
suggesting possible reasons why defendant and cross-complainant did not appeal, as if her reasons for not appealing
had any bearing whatever upon the scope of review of this
court on an appeal by plaintiff from the portion of the
judgment against him. Until the decision of this court in
Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602 [248 P.2d 910], it was the
settled rule that "when an appeal is taken from a part of a
judgment or order not so intimately connected with the remainder that a reversal of the part appealed from would
require a reconsideration of the whole case in the court below, an appellate court can review only the portion appealed
from. The unaffected parts must be deemed final, and can
be enforced pending the appeal." (See 4 Cal.J ur.2d, § 535,
p. 389.) This rule has been followed in every case decided
by this court prior to the Hamasaki case, supra, and it has
never been departed from except in the Hamasaki case. In
Glassco v. El Sereno Cot[ntry Club, Inc., 217 Cal. 90 [17 P.2d
703], the late Chief Justice Waste, speaking for a unanimous
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court, said (p. 91): "Preliminarily, it might be said that that
portion of the judgment denying the appellants a lien, and
which is attacked by the plaintiffs in their brief herein, is not
properly a subject of review upon this appeal because of the
insufficiency of the notice of appeal. The notice states that
the appeal is 'from so much of the judgment herein as denies
relief to the plaintiffs against the said defendant, Clotilde
G. Castruccio . . . ' The notice of appeal makes no mention
of that separate and distinct portion of the judgment denying
plaintiffs a lien. It is elementary that an appeal from a portion of a judgment brings up for review only that portion
designated in the notice of appeal. (2 Cal.Jur. 155, sec. 25.)
While it is true that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed with a view to hearing causes on their merits (Harrelson v. Miller & Lux, 182 Cal. 408, 414 [188 Pac. 800] ), we
are of the opinion that the notice filed in the present case does
not present 'a mere misdescription' of the judgment, calling
for the application of said rule, but rather presents a situation somewhat analogous to that presented in Dimity v.
Dixon, 74 Cal.App. 714, 718 [241 Pac. 905], viz., one where
the description of that portion of the judgment appealed
from is so clear and unmistakable as to preclude a description
of that portion of the judgment denying appellants a lien.''
The following cases fully support the rule that an appellate
court has jurisdiction to review the portion of the judgment
appealed from only unless the part appealed from is so interwoven and connected with the remainder, or so dependent
thereon, that the appeal from a part affects the other parts
or inYolves a consideration of the whole, and is really an
appeal from the whole judgment: Lake v. Superior Court,
187 Cal. 116 [200 P. 1041]; G. Ganahl Lbr. Co. v. We1:nsveig,
168 Cal. 664 [143 P. 1025] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360
r125 P. 904, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1319] ; In re Burdick, 112 Cal.
387 r44 P. 734]; Luck v. L1wk, 83 Cal. 574 [23 P. 1035];
Early v. Mannix, 15 Cal. 149; Pacific Mutnal L. I. Co. v.
Fisher, 106 Cal. 224 [39 P. 758].
It must be remembered that the judgment denying plaintiff relief was based upon his complaint and the evidence
offered by him in support of the allegations of the complaint
that he was the owner of the property as a result of the deed
executed by his father and placed in escrow to be delivered
to plaintiff upon his father's death. The judgment denying
defendant relief was based upon the allegations of her crosscomplaint that she was the owner of the property as the
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result of an execution sale under a judgment against plaintiff.
It seems to me that if this court has the power to review the
portion of the judgment against the defendant, it should
determine on this appeal the validity of the execution sale
and the conveyances under which defendant claims and then
reverse the entire judgment with directions to render judgment either in favor of plaintiff or defendant, thus bringing
an end to the litigation. However, the majority does not
purport to do this but nevertheless reverses the judgment
against the defendant who did not appeal therefrom and
makes no contention that the judgment against her was
erroneous.
Section 938 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: ''Any
person aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in this
title. The party appealing is known as the appellant, and
the adverse party as the respondent." (Emphasis added.)
It goes without saying that plaintiff could not have appealed
from the portion of the judgment against the defendant, since
he was not aggrieved thereby, and defendant could not have
appealed from the portion of the judgment against plaintiff
for the same reason. Therefore, plaintiff appealed from· the
only portion of the judgment from which he could lawfully
appeal.
Section 956 of the Code of Civil Procedure which covers
the matters which may be reviewed on appeal from a judgment concludes with the following sentence : ''The provisions
of this section do not authorize the court to review any decision or order from which an appeal might have been taken.''
The clear implication of this provision is that the court may
not review any decisions or order from which an appeal might
have been but was not taken. Applying this provision to the
case at bar it seems clear that this court is not authorized
to review the judgment against defendant from which no
appeal was taken.
To summarize, it appears that the plaintiff appealed from
the portion of the judgment denying the relief demanded by
him in his complaint. The majority opinion holds that his
appeal is meritorious. The relief demanded by defendant
was by way of cross-complaint and the judgment denied her
such relief. She did not appeal. It is conceded that her
claim of title is based upon instruments entirely separate
and apart from the instruments on which plaintiff's claim
of title is based. Defendant has not sought to have this court
review the portion of the judgment denying her relief on her

Mar.1954]

OsBORN

v.

OsBORN

371

[42 C.2d 358; 267 P.2d 333]

cross-complaint. It is obvious that the portion of the judgment denying her relief on her cross-complaint is in nowise
related to the portion of the judgment denying plaintiff the
relief demanded in his complaint. There is no interdependence
between the two portions of the judgment. Such being the
case, it is clear under both the code provisions relating to review on appeal and the authorities which I have cited above
that the review here should be limited to the portion of the
judgment from which plaintiff appealed, and that the judgment against defendant from which no appeal was taken
should not be reviewed.
As stated earlier in this opinion the only case holding to
the contrary is Hamasaki v. Flotho, supra. The decision
in that case was based upon the theory advanced by the majority that even though there was no appeal from the judgment and only an appeal from an order granting a limited
new trial, this court had the power to review the judgment
because it felt required to do so "in the interests of justice.'' There was no question of any interdependence in the
Hamasaki case as there was only one judgment and one order,
both of which were in favor of the respondent. The majority
now rely upon the Hamasaki case as authority for reversing
the judgment against defendant in the case at bar from which
no appeal has been taken. Certainly the Hamasaki case is
not authority for the holding in this case. The other cases
relied upon by the majority clearly fall within the exception
to the rule that where the part of the judgment appealed
from is so interwoven and connected with the remainder, or
so dependent thereon, that the appeal from a part affects the
other parts or involves a consideration of the whole, that it
is really an appeal from the whole judgment. The case at
bar does not fall within this rule as clearly appears from what
I have heretofore stated.
It should be noted that the foregoing rule relates only to
judgments which are not divisible into separate parts. And
in order .for the rule to be applicable, the judgment, on its
face, must disclose that the part appealed from is interwoven
with or dependent upon other parts not appealed from. In
other words, unless the interdependence of the separate parts
of the judgment appears upon the .face of the judgment itself
there can be no basis for holding that the part appealed .from
is so interwoven and connected with the remainder, or so
dependent thereon, that the appeal from a part affects the
other parts or involves a consideration of the whole judg-
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ment. Since the judgment in the case at bar is in two separate and distinct parts or paragraphs and neither makes any
reference to the other, there is no basis whatever for a holding that they are in any way interwoven with or dependent
upon each other.
The effect of the majority holding in this case is not only
to create confusion in the law, as it undoubtedly will, but
it places an additional burden on both appellate and trial
courts to review portions of judgments from which no appeal
is taken in clear violation of the statutory provisions which
I have heretofore cited. The right of appeal is clearly statutory as well as the scope of review. The Legislature has sought
to limit the power of appellate courts to review only such
portions of judgments as may be appealed from. This legislation has a dual purpose. First, to reduce the amount of work
required by an appellate court in disposing of an appeal, and
second, to limit the issues which may be retried in the trial
court in the event of a reversal which should have the effect
of saving the time of both the trial court and litigants. It now
appears that the majority of this court not only ignores this
salutory legislation but overrules the long line of authorities
upholding and applying such legislation without even mentioning either the legislation or the authorities. The majority
claims the right to do this "in the interests of justice." However, it has been aptly stated that "Justice is what is well
established" and that "Justice is compliance with the written
laws.'' I find no basis for the holding of the majority in this
case in any concept of justice with which I am familiar.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. It is my view that the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McComb of the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, Division Two (Osborn v. Osborn
(1953; Cal.App.), 256 P.2d 653, 657), correctly disposes of
the legal issues presented by the undisputed facts alleged,
proved, and found in this case. I shall state the facts in
somewhat greater detail than they are stated by Justice
McComb in order that I may hereinafter point out those facts
which, in my opinion, have caused the majority of this court
to announce an erroneous view of the applicable law.
In order to compromise a dispute as to who was entitled
to the property of Chloie I. Osborn, deceased mother of plaintiff Merinoeth and wife of Thomas D. Osborn, plaintiff and
Thomas on June 27, 1939, executed a contract entitled "Stipulation.'' The validity of this contract is not questioned. On
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,July 21, 1939, such contract was filed in the proceeding for
probate of the estate of Chloie I. Osborn. It provides in material part that the probate court may set aside disputed real
property (Lot 97) to Thomas as having been the homestead of
Thomas and Chloie; that Thomas "will execute either by deed,
contract or declaration of trust sufficient documents, conveyances or declarations so that . . . Lot 97 . . . will be retained
in the name of Thomas D. Osborn, during his lifetime and
that the same should vest in his son Merinoeth R. Osborn at
the time of the demise of the said Thomas . . . [A]ll income
on the property will go to and belong to 'rhomas D. Osborn
during his lifetime and out of the said sum of monies received,
he will pay all ordinary and usual expenses, such as, maintenance, taxes, repair and ordinary improvements due to
wear and tear. Any surplus from said amounts shall belong
to Thomas . . . This Stipulation shall be binding upon the
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the parties
hereto.''
Pursuant to this agreement the probate court on July 21,
1939, determined that Lot 97 had been the homestead of
Thomas and Chloie and set it aside to Thomas as his separate
property.
On July 7, 1939, Thomas signed a grant deed of Lot 97
to plaintiff Merinoeth, "reserving to the grantor the exclusive possession and the use and enjoyment in his own right
of the rents, issues and profits of said property . . . during
the term of his natural life. This deed is executed in accordance with the terms and conditions of that certain trust
agreement of July 7th, 1939, . . . and is subject to all conditions, exceptions and reservations as in said trust agreement
provided.''
The "trust agreement" of July 7 provides that "the said
deed is to be turned over and delivered to the trustees herein
[ Finkenstein and Warner] to be used, delivered and held
under the terms and conditions in this agreement set forth'';
the deed shall reserve to Thomas, the grantor, a life estate
and ''the right to revoke the deed in the event second party
[Merinoeth] wilfully harms grantor, and second party reserves the right to cancel this agreement if grantor wilfully
harms second party"; the only powers and duties of the
trustees are to keep the deed and not record it during the
life of Thomas and to deliver it to Merinoeth only on the
death of Thomas, and to defend against any attempt by
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either party "to break the terms of the within trust agreement'' ; Thomas ''agrees to will any and all right, title, or
interest he may have in said real property to'' Merinoeth;
the agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, and assigns
of the parties; and "the wilful failure or refusal of either
party to comply with the obligations herein provided, on
his part to be performed, shall permit either party to rescind
this agreement and shall confer upon the grantor the right
to cancel the within mentioned deed and this agreement.''
On January 14, 1946, Merinoeth, Thomas, and the trustees
executed an ''agreement cancelling trust agreement.'' In
March, 1946, by an exchange of letters, the parties agreed
to rescind the cancellation agreement. These two agreements
were executed in the course of unsuccessful negotiations between Thomas and plaintiff for the purchase by Thomas of
plaintiff's interest in Lot 97. Evidence of the negotiations
and the cancellation agreements and accompanying letters
has probative value as it tends to show that Thomas recognized
that Merinoeth had a valuable remainder interest.
The opinion of Justice McComb disposes of the issues raised
by the above stated facts in the following manner:
"Questions: First: Did the trial court properly decline
to quiet title in the parcel of land in question in plaintiff?
"Yes. The following rules are here pertinent:
"(1) An escrow is a written instrument or personal property which is delivered to a third party by the grantor, maker,
promisor or obligor to be held by the depositary until the
happening of a designated event or the performance of a
designated condition and then to be delivered to the grantee,
promisee or obligee. ( Civ. Code, § 1057. See also cited
cases in 10 Cal.Jur. [1923] Escrows, § 1, n. 2, p. 576.)
"(2) When a deed is deposited by a grantor with a third
person to be handed to the grantee on the death of the grantor
. . . without any intention of a present transfer of title,
but on the contrary, with the intention of the grantor to
reserve the right of dominion over the deed and the right
to revoke or recall it there is no effective delivery. . . .
(Williams v. Kidd [1915], 170 Cal. 631, 637 et seq. [151 P. 1,
Ann. Cas. 1916E 703] .)
"(3) Plaintiff in a quiet title action must depend on the
strength of his own title and not on the weakness of that
of defendant. Thus, if he fails to prove title in himself,
he is not entitled to recover. (Alspach v. Landrum [1947],
82 Cal.App.2d 901, 903 [1] [187 P.2d 130]; Tanner v. Title
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Ins. & Trust Co. [1942], 20 Cal.2d 814, 825 [13] [129 P.2d
383] .)
"Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the present
case we find that under rule ( 1) the handing of the deed
to defendants Finkenstein and Warner created an escrow,
and since Mr. Osborn reserved the right to revoke or cancel
the deed upon the happening of certain conditions, there
was no intent to make an unconditional delivery of the deed.
Therefore, it not having been delivered to plaintiff prior to
his father's death, under rule (2) the deed was never delivered
and no title passed to plaintiff. Hence, under rule ( 3),
plaintiff having failed to prove title in himself the trial court
properly held that he was not entitled to have title quieted
in him.
''Second: Was there substantial evidence to sustain the
trial court's finding that the transaction between the parties
did not create a trust agreement but merely created an
escrow?
"Yes. The transaction falls squarely within the definition
of an escrow as set forth under rule (1) supra. There is a
total absence of any of the elements of a trust agreement.
Therefore the court's finding is supported by substantial
evidence.''
The majority herein proceed upon the fallacious premise
that ''Thomas was bound by the terms of the trust agreement,
executed contemporaneously with the deed, not to attempt to
recall the deed from the possession of the trustees . . .
Thomas did not retain control over the deed after he delivered
it to the trustees. There is nothing in the trust agreement,
or external to it, to indicate that Thomas did not intend the
transmission of the deed to the trustees to be a valid legal
delivery." Obviously such "finding" by the majority invades the province of the trier of fact and draws inferences
from both the documents and the surrounding circumstances
contrary to those drawn by the trial judge. Why was an
escrow created and conditions for cancellation specified if
the delivery was unconditional1 Furthermore, I cannot agree
that "Thomas was bound by the terms of the trust agreement." The signing by Thomas of the July 7 trust agreement and deed was, at best, an ineffective attempt to perform
the June 27 agreement. It appears that the June 27 agreement, rather than the trust agreement, was binding and
enforceable. And the June 27 agreement has never been
discharged by performance or otherwise.
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The majority opinion here appears to be an attempt to
give, or to lay the foundation for giving, plaintiff Merinoeth
and the nonappealing cross-complainant Louise a remedy
akin to quasi-specific enforcement of the June 27 agreement.
But that is a remedy which Merinoeth should have sought
against the representatives of the estate of his deceased father,
and Merinoeth has not seen fit to institute such proceedings
and proceed on such a theory.
For the reasons above stated I should affirm the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 25,
1954. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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